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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
UNITED STATES v. RICHEY: 
DISCLOSURE OF TAX 
INFORMATION BY FORMER IRS 
AGENT NOT PROTECTED BY 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Richey,! the Ninth Circuit held that the 
disclosure by a former Internal Revenue Service agent of con-
fidential tax information in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7213 2 
was not speech worthy of first amendmentS protection even 
though it touched upon a matter of public concern.4 
1. 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991) (per O'Scannlain, J., with whom Wright, J. joins; 
Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
2. 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) provides: 
(a) Returns and return information. 
(l)Federal employees and other persons. It shall be unlaw-
ful for any officer or employee of the United States, 
... or any former officer or employee, willfully to disclose 
to any person, except as authorized in this title, any 
return or return information (as defined in section 
6103(b». Any violation of this paragraph shall be a felony 
punishable upon conviction by a fine in any amount not 
exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment of not more than 5 
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution, 
and if such offense is committed by any officer or employ-
ee of the United States, he shall, in addition to any other 
punishment, be dismissed from office or discharged from 
employment upon conviction for such offense. 
Section 7213(a) imposes criminal penalties for violation of the confidentiality require-
ments spelled out in detail in section 6103, discussed infra. Therefore case law defin-
ing what comprises a disclosure, under what circumstances a disclosure may be 
authorized. and related matters centers around interpretation of section 6103. There 
have been no criminal prosecutions under section 7213(a) heretofore. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances.· 
4. Richey, 924 F.2d at 863. For a discussion of "public concern," see, n.53 infra, 
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The court ruled that the government's compelling interest in 
maintaining a workable tax systemS outweighed Richey's personal 
interest in having an unbiased judge preside at his trial,6 his 
interest in commenting on matters of public concern,7 and the pub-
lic interest in being informed about the operation of the courts.8 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion balanced Richey's right to 
speak on matters of public concern under the first amend-
ment against the government interest in the confidentiality of 
tax returns and tax return information expressed in 28 U.S.C .. 
§ 7213. This note measures that opinion against the back-
ground of section 6103, the statute upon which section 7213 
depends, and against recent Supreme Court decisions scruti-
nizing statutes that purport to limit a speaker's right to speak 
on matters of public interest. 
FACTS 
Lawrence Richey, a retired Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
agent with 25 years of service, was indicted in 1985 for par-
ticipation in a tax shelter scheme.9 After several trials and 
appeals,t° a jury found him guilty of conspiracy and aiding 
and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns. ll Judge 
5. [d. at 862. 
6. [d. See also 28 U.S.C. § 455, which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned. 
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circum-
stances: 
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party ... 
7. Richey, 924 F.2d at 860. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. at 858. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1989)(unpublished 
memorandum decision) Richey was hired to prepare the tax returns of persons par-
ticipating in "payroll discount" or "consulting services" tax shelters subsequently ruled 
by the IRS to have been set up to evade taxes. Memorandum decision at 2 and 10. See 
also, United States v. Russell, 804 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1986). 
10. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1 Proceedings 
docket. Judgment filed July 6, 1987. This document makes reference to several relat-
ed proceedings. Richey was one of many defendants involved in the original govern-
ment prosecution. He tried unsuccessfully to get his case as hired tax preparer 
separated from the cases against the initiators of the scheme. 
11. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1 Filed July 
6, 1987. JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER "Finding and 
Judgment. Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offenses of Count 1 -
Conspiracy; in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371; and Counts 13-26, inclusive, - Aiding and 
Assisting in the preparation of False Tax Returns; in violation of26 U.S.C. 7206 (2)." 
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Alan A. McDonald, who had presided over the last of these tri-
als, sentenced Richey to probation with special conditions.12 
Condition (b), "Defendant shall abstain from making any 
derogatory remarks against the Government of the United 
States," drew the attention of the local press, television, and 
radio stations. Three newsmen contacted Richey for comment 
on the gag order.18 In response to questions by a reporter for the 
Spokesman-Review and Spokane Chronicle, Richey speculat-
ed that Judge McDonald, whom he had audited and assessed 
for additional tax fifteen years earlier, might have wanted 
"retribution."14 In a videotaped interview with KNDO TV, 
Richey stated in response to a question as to why he thought 
Judge McDonald had imposed the restraint, "I thought it was 
rather malicious. I may have rubbed him the wrong way in my 
frequent letters to the editors; I don't know. I also remember 
interviewing him as an agent about fifteen years ago and 
assessing some additional tax ... "16 
For these statements, Richey was charged with and con-
victed of three felony counts of unauthorized disclosure of tax 
return information in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7213.16 Richeis 
12. Richey was sentenced to three years imprisonment on each count, for a 
total of 45 years. ld. The sentencing order provided: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED execution of the sentences as to 
imprisonment, only, hereby imposed are [sic] suspended 
and the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of 
five years, with the following special conditions of probation: 
(a) Defendant shall continue to file timely tax returns and 
pay all tax due and owing to the United States; 
(b) Defendant shall abstain from making any derogatory 
statements against the Government of the United States; 
(c) The Defendant shall refrain from associating with 
anyone who advocates non-payment of taxes justly due; 
and 
(d) Defendant shall perform 250 hours of community ser-
vice, at the direction of the probation officer. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, LAWRENCE 
M. RICHEY, shall pay one-third the costs of prosecution 
(emphasis added). 
13. Richey, 924 F.2d at 858. 
14. ld. Richey's remarks were printed on the front page of the Spokesman-
Review and Spokane Chronicle newspapers on October 7, 1987. That day, the news 
director of the Yakima radio station called Richey and asked him to verifY that he had 
audited McDonald. Richey confirmed the audit, but refused to reveal the year or out-
come. This information was broadcast four times.ld. at 864. The videotaped interview 
was initiated that day and broadcast two months later. ld. 
15. ld. at 864. Nothing in the record indicates the contents of his frequent let-
ters to the editor. 
16. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington, CR-88-217-S. Judge Harry L. 
Hupp presided over the non-jury trial, and sentenced Richey to supervised probation 
for a period of three years. Judgment filed Nov. 3, 1988. 
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appeal to the Ninth Circuit of this conviction raised three 
issues, principally arguing that Richey's disclosure of tax 
information was protected by the first amendment, and that his 
indictment should have been dismissed. 17 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. STATUTES PURPORTING TO LIMIT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
When a statute is challenged as an impermissible inter-
ference with rights under the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court will weigh the individual's constitutional right against 
the state interest asserted. IS "When a substantial claim of an 
abridgement of [a right] is advanced, the presumption of valid-
ity that belongs to an exercise of state power must not [prevent] 
close examination of the merits of the controversy.-19 Whether 
the statute is a state law or a law passed by Congress, the Court 
will conduct this examination.20 
In NAACP u. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court stated the 
constitutional limitation where the government asserts a 
In the meantime, since Richey's comments to the press violated the condition of 
probation forbidding derogatory statements against the Government, Richey's pro-
bation for his prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 371 and 26 U.S.C. 7206(c) was 
revoked, and he was sentenced by another judge to a new probationary term which did 
not contain that condition. Richey, 924 F.2d at 864. 
17. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991). 
"1. Whether the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss; 2. Whether the 
trial court should have granted the motion for removal of counsel; 3. Whether Appellant's 
disclosure of his audit of his trial judge was protected by the First Amendment.-
Richey's motion for removal of counsel was based on an erroneous reading of sec-
tion 7213 in which Richey's attorney suggests that the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the 
case should be removed since he disclosed the amount of tax paid and the tax years 
involved in Judge McDonald's audit.ld. at 7. 
18. In recent decades the Supreme Court has elaborated on the interpretation 
of the first amendment in many areas. We are here concerned with a challenge to a 
statute which places a content restriction on speech. E.g. Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829 (1978). 
19. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 293 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
20. Although most recent cases reaching the Court have challenged state 
statutes, e.g., Riley v. Nat'1. Fed'n. of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), concerning the 
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, many cases during World War I and dur-
ing the 1950's challenged federal statutes aimed at punishing subversive activity, e.g. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), wherein Justice Holmes set forth the 
framework by which to measure the words against the statute; "The question in 
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. - Id. at 52. 
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substantial interest in regulating activity protected by the 
first amendment.21 While recognizing that governmental reg-
ulation having an incidental effect on first amendment free-
doms may be permitted in certain narrowly defined 
instances,22 the Court held that the state may not employ 
"means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties 
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."23 The NAACP 
boycott, which violated Mississippi anti-boycott statutes, was 
a protected speech activity insofar as it was non-violent.24 The 
Court reasoned that the presence of activity protected by the 
first amendment demands "precision of regulation" where the 
state seeks to impose liability.25 
In 1980, in Consolidation Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n., 
the Supreme Court reviewed the theories offered to justify state 
regulation of protected speech activity.26 Employing an analyt-
ical framework which has since guided the court in a line of cases 
challenging statutes and regulations burdening speech, the 
court examined the Public Service Commission order banning 
certain bill inserts to see ifit was a) a reasonable time, place or 
manner restriction; b) a narrowly tailored means of serving a 
compelling state interest; or c) a permissible subject matter 
regulation.27 The court found that the order was none of these, 
21. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912, 916 (1982), (quoting 
the "precision of regulation" standard from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963) and other earlier cases). In Claiborne, the Mississippi Supreme Court had held 
the NAACP liable and awarded damages to the white merchants of Claiborne County 
for economic losses incurred over a seven year period as a result of a civil rights boy-
cott launched at an NAACP meeting. The Supreme Court found that Mississippi 
could not hold the NAACP liable under the circumstances. 
22. [d. at 912 n.47. "a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; ifit furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." (quoting 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968». 
23. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 920, (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 
(1960». 
24. [d. at 915. 
25. [d. at 916 n.50. "the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the statements in 
issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are 
of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect,'" (quoting 
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,335). 
26. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The 
Court invalidated a New York Public Service Commission order prohibiting public util-
ity companies from placing inserts discussing public policy issues in monthly bills. 
27. [d. at 535. Pacific Gas and Elec. CO. V. Public Utils. Comm'n. of California, 
475 U.S. 1 (1986); Riley v. Nat'I. Fed'n. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); and Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) are three recent cases which 
5
Pagano: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
148 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:143 
since the Public Service Commission admitted that its aim was 
"to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they address 
controversial issues of public policy. "28 
The Court rejected two arguments which would have lim-
ited the individual's right to speak when the state seeks to 
impose subject matter restrictions on freedom of speech. To the 
first, that the state may limit speech from certain sources, the 
Court replied, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of 
its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the 
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, 
or individual."29 Second, the Court rejected the state suggestion 
that speech may be restricted if an alternative avenue exists.30 
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court 
invalidated a Virginia statute which imposed criminal penal-
ties for the disclosure of confidential information.31 The state 
contended that without a requirement of confidentiality such 
as the statute imposed, the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission could not function properly; and that premature 
disclosure of sensitive information presented an "immediate 
threat to the orderly administration of justice. "32 Virginia 
closely examine the second and third prongs of the analysis required by Consolidated 
Edison, namely, whether the regulation in question is a content based restriction serv-
ing a compelling state interest. 
28. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537. 
29. Id. at 533 (quoting First Nat'l, Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978». 
30. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 541 n.10: "Although a time, place, and man-
ner restriction cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of com-
munication open to potential speakers, see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 
431 U.S. at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may 
justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means 
of expression. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. at 757 n.15; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 4ll n.4 (1974) (per curiam)." 
In his dissent to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Justice Kennedy 
observed, "That the avenue left open is more burdensome than the one foreclosed is 
'sufficient to characterize [a statute] as an infringement on First Amendment activ-
ities.' (citations) As the Court reaffirmed just two Terms ago, '[t]he First Amendment 
protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they 
believe to be the most effective means for so doing.'" (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 
at 424.) Austin, llO S. Ct. at 1423. 
31. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1977). Landmark 
was found guilty and fined under a Virginia statute for publishing an article report-
ing confidential information disclosed in an inquiry pending before the Virginia 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Id. at 831-32. There were injunctions and 
restraining orders limiting several other media outlets in their coverage of the issue, 
and another newspaper had been convicted of violation of the statute. 
32. Id. at 833, (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 
712, 233 S.E.2d, at 129.) 
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argued that confidentiality encourages the filing of complaints 
by protecting witnesses from possible retaliation; protects 
judges from injury caused by frivolous or unwarranted com-
plaints; and generally assures confidence in the judiciary as an 
institution by providing for orderly disclosure after groundless 
claims have been weeded out by the inquiry process. 55 
Accepting these state goals as permissible, the Court 
inquired whether criminal sanctions are an appropriate tool for 
insuring the confidentiality of the judicial inquiry process,34 and 
concluded that the state interests advanced are insufficient to 
justify the imposition of criminal sanctions.56 
The Court turned to the public interest in learning about 
what Landmark published, and found that Landmark, in pro-
viding accurate information about the judicial inquiry, served 
the interest in public scrutiny and discussion of government 
that the first amendment was adopted to protect.58 Since the 
Virginia statute sought to punish speech so near the core of the 
first amendment, the state interest in protecting judicial rep-
utations from harm was an insufficient reason "for repressing 
speech that would otherwise be free."57 
In arguing for the necessity of confidentiality, Virginia 
depended on a state legislative finding "that a clear and pre-
sent danger to the orderly administration of justice would be 
created by divulgence of the proceedings of the Commission. "38 
33. ld. at 835. 
34. ld. at 834, 837. While 47 states and the District of Columbia have confi-
dentiality requirements, only Virginia and Hawaii provide criminal sanctions for dis-
closure. Only Maine, Mississippi, and Washington do nof appear on the list of states 
having "some mechanism for inquiring into judicial disability and conduct" which 
appears as an appendix to the opinion ofthe court at 846-848. The court suggested that 
methods other than criminal sanctions might be effective in enforcing the confiden-
tiality desired for the proceedings, pointing out that other states used oaths of secre-
cy and contempt proceedings to prevent participant disclosure. ld. at 841. 
35. ld. at 838. 
36. ld. at 839. 
37. Id. at 842, (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 
(1954». Quoting from Justice Black's majority opinion in Bridges u. California and from 
the dissent by Justice Frankfurter as well, the court noted, "'The assumption that 
respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrong-
ly appraises the character of American public opinion' ... Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in 
his dissent in Bridges, agreed that speech cannot be punished when the purpose is sim-
ply 'to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as individuals or as anoint-
ed priests set apart from the community and spared the criticism to which in a 
democracy other public servants are exposed,'" ld. at 842. 
38. ld. at 843. 
7
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The Court examined the ramifications of permitting the state 
to override protections of the Bill of Rights by a general state-
ment of legislative finding. 39 Before the Virginia Supreme 
Court, Landmark had argued "before a state may punish 
expression, it must prove by 'actual facts' the existence of a 
clear and present danger to the orderly administration of 
justice."4O The Court accepted that premise, noting that the 
Virginia Supreme Court had relied on a legislative finding of 
danger, but had found no actual danger.41 The Court found 
that the danger evidenced by the record was not clear and pre-
sent, and that the activity the state sought to punish was pre-
cisely one "envisioned by the Founders in presenting the first 
amendment for ratification. "43 
The Landmark analysis has formed the basis for subsequent 
cases challenging statutory limitations on a first amendment 
right to disclose confidential information. Butterworth v. Smith 
expanded the analysis to include the interest of the speaker in 
disclosure.43 Reporter Smith challenged a Florida statute pro-
hibiting him from disclosing his own grand jury testimony. The 
Court held that insofar as it prohibits a grand jury witness from 
disclosing his own testimony, the Florida statute violates the 
first amendment." 
39. [d. at 843-45. 
40. [d. at 843, (quoting Landmark, 217 Va. at 706, 233 S.E. 2d at 125). 
41. [d. at 843-44. "Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry 
when First Amendment rights are at stake ... A legislature appropriately inquires into 
and may declare the reasons impelling legislative action bl!t the judicial function com-
mands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls within reach of the 
statute and ifso whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it 
otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative 
definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power 
would be nullified." [d. 
42. [d. at 845, (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962». The question 
before the court was whether Landmark and other press, as third persons who are 
strangers to the judicial inquiry may be punished for divulging truthful information. 
The court specifically reserved the question of whether witnesses or other participants, 
including staff employees, may be punished for disclosing confidential information. 
[d. at 837. See Butterworth, infra. 
43. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990). Reporter Michael Smith tes-
tified before a Florida grand jury regarding improper behavior of certain public offi-
cials. He was warned that he could not disclose his grand jury testimony without 
subjecting himself to criminal penalties under Florida's grand jury confidentiality 
statute, which provided that disclosure may be ordered by the court for use "in the 
defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal case and for no other purpose whatso-
ever." [d. at 1379. Since he wanted to report his investigation, including that portion 
of it which formed his grand jury testimony, he filed suit seeking declaratory relief and 
an injunction preventing the state from prosecuting him. [d. 
44. [d. at 1379-80. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/13
1992] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 
The Court reaffirmed its Landmark holding, linking its con-
sideration of grand jury secrecy safeguards in Butterworth to 
its former consideration of judicial inquiry rules by observing 
the tension between First Amendment rights and "govern-
ment investigatory proceedings. "46 Pointing out that Virginia 
had "offered little more than assertion and conjecture" in sup-
port of 'its belief that criminal sanctions were necessary to 
promote the objectives of its statutory scheme, the Court rea-
soned that Florida likewise was unable to show that its inter-
ests were served by the permanent ban on disclosure.48 
Finally, the Court examined Smith's interest in disclosure, 
observing that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and similar rules in a majority of states did not 
impose upon witnesses an obligation of secrecy with respect to 
their own testimony.47 The Court concluded that the statute's 
impact on Smith's ability to make a truthful statement on 
matters of public importance is "dramatic."48 "[t]he ban extends 
... into the indefinite future. The potential for abuse of the 
Florida prohibition, through its employment as a device to 
silence those who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities 
on the part of public officials, is apparent. "49 
Butterworth and Landmark both concern state statutes 
prescribing criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of con-
fidential information. The Supreme Court has found the state 
interests asserted insufficient to permit the burden that such 
criminal sanctions impose on speech near the core of the first 
amendment - the right of citizens to speak out and the right of 
the public to know and discuss matters of public interest. 
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF 
.GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. 
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
rejected the principle that a public employee must refrain 
45. [d. at 1380. 
46. [d. Florida's perjury and witness tampering statutes, and the Florida courts' 
subpoena and contempt powers provide sufficient control over grand jury processes. "We 
think the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best, and insuffi-
cient to outweigh the first amendment interest in speech involved". [d. at 1382. 
47. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1382. The court found it not conclusive, but 
probative of the weight to be assigned Florida's interests that the Advisory Committee 
called the seal of secrecy "an unnecessary hardship (which) may lead to h\justice if a wit-
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from speaking out on matters of public interest, "which in the 
absence of such position he would have an undoubted right to 
engage in. "60 However, the state interest in regulating the 
speech of its employees, arising from its interest in promoting 
efficiency of the public services it performs, differs from its 
interest in regulating the speech of the general public. The 
Court declined to lay down a general standard for the regula-
tion of the speech of public employees, but suggested that a bal-
ance must be struck between the employee interest in 
commenting on a matter of public importance and the state 
interest in promoting efficiency.61 Noting that an employee's 
speech disclosing confidential matters or seriously under-
mining the effectiveness of working relationships might pro-
vide a permissible ground for dismissal, the Court reserved 
those issues, intimating that those situations would involve dif-
ferent considerations from Pickering's plight.62 
Public employee speech which adversely affected working 
relationships was the subject of Connick v. Meyers, where the 
content of As.sistant District Attorney Myers's speech touched 
on matters of both personal and public concern, and its form 
and context dictated further analysis. 63 In a 5-4 decision, the 
majority upheld the firing of Myers, finding that the first 
amendment does not require an employer to tolerate action 
which he believes will disrupt the office, undermine authority, 
50. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968). Pickering was a teach-
er dismissed by the Board of Education for writing a letter to the newspaper criticizing 
that Board's funding practices. 
51. 1d. at 568. 
52. 1d. at 570 n.3. Pickering did not disclose confidential information in his let-
ter to the newspaper. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme 
Court treated the issue of a government employee disclosing confidential information. 
Snepp, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who had agreed not to 
disclose classified information without authorization, was ordered by the Court to place 
the profits from his book about the CIA in a constructive trust when the Court found 
that he had published in violation of that agreement. Although Snepp attempted to 
raise the issue of a prior restraint under the first amendment, the Court treated the 
agreement as a fiduciary obligation well within the mandate of the CIA Director to 
demand in the interests of national security. Courts have imposed strict limitations 
on the disclosure of information classified as touching upon national security. See e.g., 
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 
(1972), where the court proposed standards accommodating both national security and 
first amendment interests. 
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). After Assistant District Attorney 
Myers refused a transfer and circulated a questionnaire among fellow employees, her 
superior, District Attorney Connick, fired her for insubordination and interfering with 
working relationships. Examining the questionnaire in this context, the Court found 
that it substantially reflected a personnel dispute and only tangentially touched on 
a matter of public importance. 
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and destroy close working relationships.54 The dissent found 
that Myers's dismissal violated her first amendment rights as 
a public employee because Connick had not shown that Myers's 
speech had caused actual disruption, and because frequent 
newspaper coverage ·of the events and personalities at the 
District Attorney's office showed that Myers's speech was 
about a matter of public concern. 55 Both majority and dissent, 
though disagreeing on the interpretation of the facts of the case, 
agreed that a public employee's rights to speak out on matters 
of public concern should not be limited by a general rule, but 
must be viewed in a factual context.56 
In another close decision, Rankin u. McPherson, the Court 
upheld a public clerical worker's right to speak on matters of 
public concern, reiterating the principle that a court must 
examine the statement in its circumstances, but adding that the 
state must bear the burden ofjustifying a discharge. 57 Balancing 
Constable Rankin's interest in preserving discipline and effi-
ciency in the workplace with McPherson's right to express a 
political opinion in a private conversation, the Court affirmed 
the Court of Appeals ruling that "however ill-considered" her 
opinion was, it did not make her unfit for the job. 68 
The Ninth Circuit has applied the factual tests of public con-
cern and actual disruption set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Pickering and Connick where a public employee has claimed 
that his first amendment right to speak on matters of public 
concern was violated by his dismissal, suspension, or transfer. 
In Allen u. Scribner the court stated that the threshold inquiry 
is whether the statements address a matter of public concern, 
and that the content, form, and context of the speech at issue 
will assist in that determination. 59 Criticism of government pol-
icy, competency, and efficiency which is purposefully directed 
to the public rests on the "highest rung of the hierarchy of [f]irst 
54. [d. at 154. 
55. [d. at 160, n.2. 
56. 1d. at 153, 157. 
57. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). McPherson, a clerk in the 
county Constable's office, was fired for a remark she made in a private conversation 
with a co-worker as they listened to a radio report of the assassination attempt on 
President Reagan, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." [d. at 388. 
58. 1d. at 383. 
59. Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1987). The court reversed a sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff Allen, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact exist-
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[a]mendment values"60 because it brings to light an alleged 
breach of public trust on the part of public officials.81 Second, 
once the subject speech has been determined to address a 
matter of public concern, the government must show that the 
speech has caused actual disruption of the public services it per-
forms. Potential disruption cannot "serve as a pretext for sti-
fling legitimate speech or penalizing public employees for 
expressing unpopular views. "82 
The Ninth Circuit has recently added to the body oflaw sur-
rounding the first amendment speech rights of government 
employees in cases concerning dismissal or other job-related 
retaliation. 8s In United States v. Richey, the Ninth Circuit 
considered for the first time the criminal punishment of speech 
on a matter of public concern by a present or former 
government employee. 
C. ANALYSIS OF TAX STATUTES 
Before 1977, federal tax returns were public records; under 
former 26 U.S.C. § 6103, decisions regarding individual 
60. 1d. at 431, quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) and McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F. 2d 
lll0, 111'4 (9th Cir. 1983). 
61. 1d. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148). 
62. 1d. at 432, (quoting McKinley, 705 F.2d at lll5). 
63. The Ninth Circuit has applied a fact-driven analysis, eXamining whether the 
sanctioned speech touched on a matter of public concern, and whether actual disruption 
occurred in these cases: 
In Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), a divided court, while 
agreeing that the law is clearly established that public employees cannot be disciplined 
solely for speaking out on matters of public interest, disagreed on the application of 
the rule to the facts of that case. 
In Burgess v. Pierce County, 918 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990), the court used the 
Pickering. Connick analysis to rule that the question of whether a fire marshall's dis-
missal for speaking out against proposed fire ordinances was a retaliatory violation 
of his first amendment right and not the result of disruption caused by his speech is 
a question offact precluding summary judgment. 
In Havekost v. United States Dep't. of the Navy, 925 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1991), the 
court weighed Havekost's claim that her speech was about a matter of public inter-
est, and not simply an employee grievance, against the fact that she made no attempt 
to reach the general public in her speech activity. The Ninth Circuit found against 
Havekost, citing Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 613, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1990) which stated 
that actual communication with the press on an issue of some public interest might 
indicate public speech. Havekost, 925 F.2d at 319. 
In Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 3ll (9th Cir. 1991), the court denied first amend-
ment relief to a whistleblower employed by the Veteran's Administration (VA) who 
claimed that he was being harassed by his employers in retaliation for his speaking 
out about VA malpractice. The court found that he had not exhausted his statutory 
remedies under various federal acts designed to protect such interests 8S he claimed. 
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disclosure and disclosure policies were within the discretion of 
the executive branch.64 By 1974, the Internal Revenue Service 
was disseminating the identifiable tax information of millions 
of taxpayers annually to various government agencies. 66 
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 and created the 
Privacy Protection Study Commission. Concerned that the 
Privacy Act would not adequately protect the confidentiality of 
tax returns, Congress in 1976 amended 26 U.S.C. § 6103 to pro-
vide that tax returns shall be confidential and not subject to dis-
closure except as provided by the statute.66 
In the eighteen subsections of section 6103, Congress 
spelled out thirteen areas of allowable disclosure.67 At the 
same time, Congress revised 26 U.S.C. § 7213,68 increasing the 
criminal penalty for an unauthorized disclosure, and created 
a civil remedy for damages caused by willful or negligent dis-
closure under section 7217.69 
64. M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4-56 (2d ed. 1989). 
65. Id. at 4-57. See also Benedict & Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns - the 
Tension between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940 
(1979). 
66. 26 U.S.C. 6103(a). Section 6103, entitled "Confidentiality and disclosure of 
returns and return information,· provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. 
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and 
except as authorized by this title-
(1) no officer or employee of the United States, 
.. . shall disclose any return or return information 
obtained by him in any manner in connection with his ser-
vice as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or 
under the provisions ofthis section. For purposes of this 
subsection, the term ·officer or employee" includes a for-
mer officer or employee (emphasis added). 
One of the factors which motivated Congress to change the fundamental posture 
of the tax disclosure statute was the substantial amount of Watergate testimony which 
revealed that President Nixon and the White House staff had allegedly attempted to 
gain tax information and even initiate audits and investigations for political purposes. 
Benedict & Lupert, supra note 65 at 942, n.5. The returns of Reverend Billy Graham, 
actor John Wayne and Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien were 
allegedly among those requested by the White House. Id. at 969. 
67. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-57. "With respect to each of these areas, the com-
mittee has tried to balance the particular office or agency's need for the information 
involved with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon 
the continuation of compliance with our country's voluntary assessment system." Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, reprinted in 1976 u.s. CONGo & ADMIN NEWS at 3747. 
68. 26 U.S.C. 7213, supra note 2. Congress substituted "willfully to disclose" for 
"to disclose" in 1978. 
69. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-58. Congress repealed section 7217 in 1982 and 
replaced it with section 7431. The statutes are essentially the same. 
13
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Thus it was against the backdrop of what Senator Weicker 
referred to as the government "lending library" which circulated 
millions of tax returns annually that Congress enacted the 
stringent restrictions on disclosure that comprise section 6103 
and its related penalty and remedial statutes.70 The House of 
Representatives and the Senate disagreed on whether disclo-
sure situations should be inclusive or exclusive under the 
statute.71 The Senate version prevailed: all tax return infor-
mation is confidential except for the specific permitted dis-
closures under the statute. 
Section 6103 stands as a strong protection against the 
indiscriminate dissemination of tax return information pre-
cisely because its provisions exclude disclosure, even against 
the claims of laws such as the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) designed to inform citizens of how personal information 
gathered by the government is being used. 72 When section 
6103 has been challenged by a request for disclosure under the 
FOIA, it has been interpreted narrowly by the courts as a 
statute that is non-discretionary; th,at is, it establishes par-
ticular criteria which have to be met before disclosure can 
take place.73 The IRS has argued that section 6103 blocks 
access to individual tax return information requested under the 
FOIA, and the courts have generally upheld the IRS position.74 
70. Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 894 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) quoting 
Senator Wi ecker, "Over the years, a myriad of government agencies have gained 
access to tax information of the IRS. De facto, IRS became a lending library ofconfi-
dential tax information. As the Privacy Commission noted, information the IRS 
maintained was treated as a 'generalized governmental asset,'" 122 CONGo REC. 
24,013 (1976). 
71. Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 3747. In the Senate version, the general rule is confidentiality. Tax return 
information is not subject to disclosure "except in those limited situations delineat-
ed in the newly amended sections of6103 where the committee decided that disclosure 
was warranted. 
There is no comparable provision in the House bill." Id. (emphasis added). 
72. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-58. 
73. Id. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (FOIA), allows citizens 
access to information gathered by the government. However, the Act contains nine 
categories of information not generally available, including materials exempt by 
statute from disclosure. Id. at 2-7, 2-11. The Internal Revenue Service has 
successfully argued that section 6103 is the type of statute that exempts information 
from disclosure because it is nondiscretionary under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3).Id. at 4-58. 
74. Under section 6103 the IRS has refused to disclose tax information it has gath-
ered about a taxpayer to the taxpayer himself, a use of probably not foreseen by 
Congress. See e.g., Cliff V. Internal Revenue Service, 496 F. Supp. 568 S.D.N.Y. 
(1980). In a suit under the FOIA by a tax attorney requesting that the IRS release inter-
nal memoranda and other documents for his use in advising a client, the court ruled 
that disclosure was forbidden in part because the requested material was tax return 
information under section 6103.Id. at 575 n.15. 
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Section 6103 appears to have accomplished Congress's pur-
pose in staunching the flow of tax information from the IRS, but 
its interpretation in district and appellate courts has not been 
uniform. Cases have centered around the issue of whether 
the giving of tax information was a permitted "disclosure" 
under the parameters of the statute. The circuit courts are split 
on how narrowly section 6103 should be construed. The nar-
rower view focusses on the agent's disclosure to discern that 
there was a violation.76 In contrast, the broader view assumes 
that it is not possible for information which is already in the 
See also, Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue Service, 484 U.S. 9 (1987) 
where the Supreme Court interpreted the effect of the Haskell amendment on section 
6103, but noted in passing that the parties agreed that -if section 6103 forbids the dis-
closure of material, it may not be produced in response to a request under the FOIA." 
Id. at 11. 
Whether tax information requested under the FOIA need be disclosed under the 
prior version of section 6103 depended on the test of whether the party had placed 
income at issue. In Association of Am. R.R. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 
1974), the court ruled that although railroads must comply with Interstate Commerce 
Commission requests for tax information, the FOIA did not require public disclosure 
of this information. The court held th!lt since the railroads did not place their total 
income in issue on the ICC forms, they had not waived their right to confidentiality. 
Id. at 118. 
75. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983) (disclosure of tax informa-
tion in a court proceeding did not justify later disclosure absent express statutory 
authorization). 
In Chandler v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), the court grant-
ed a damage award under section 7431 to the taxpayer for an IRS agent's negligent 
disclosure to the taxpayer's employer of tax return information, despite the IRS 
claim that taxpayer had waived confidentiality by filing an injunctive suit against the 
IRS.ld. at 1517, 1521. See also, Olsen v. Egger, 594 F. Supp. 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
(quoted in Chandler, 687 F. Supp. at 1518. (prior use of tax return information in a 
state court action to recover alimony and child support did not constitute a waiver of 
confidentiality. The court pointed out that such waivers were common abuses under 
the statutes prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and that the revised statute does not 
permit the court to create judicial exceptions to the general prohibition against dis-
closure.» Id. 
In Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986) a taxpayer sued the IRS 
for damages from disclosure after the IRS issued a press release outlining tax evasion 
charges against Johnson and stating that he had pleaded guilty and been convicted. 
Although the IRS had agreed not to disclose Johnson's tax evasion case as part of the 
settlement agreement, IRS guidelines permitted the issue of press releases disclos-
ing convicted tax evaders as a means of publicizing the enforcement of tax law, and 
the information was released in a routine office practice. The court, in a thorough anal-
ysis of section 6103, found no language which would permit such a press release. Id. 
at 1133. In a note which has been quoted in Lampert v. United States 854 F.2d 335, 
337 (9th Cir. 1988), the court stated the crux of the dilemma caused by strict inter-
pretation of section 6103: 
-This court recognizes that its strictly enforcing the comprehensive regulation of 
§ 6103 greatly hampers the government's ability to issue press releases concerning the 
prosecution oftax evaders. If that result is poor public policy, it is for Congress - not 
the Courts - to amend § 6103 to allow the issuing of such releases." Johnson, 640 F. 
Supp. at 1133 n.18. 
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public record to be a "disclosure."76 In addition, some circuits 
allow disclosures under the rubric of "tax administration."77 
The Sixth Circuit declined to find unauthorized disclosure 
where there was no nexus between the data disclosed and the 
furtherance of obligations controlled by Title 26.78 Similarly, 
where the disclosure of tax information was incidental to dis-
closure of information that a taxpayer had invoked the Fifth 
Amendment, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no nexus 
between that non-tax activity disclosed and the taxpayer's 
obligation to pay taxes. Thus, federal agents' limited disclosures 
were permissible in the context of the case they were pursuing.79 
76. See discussion of Ninth, Circuit cases, infra notes 80-92 and accompanying 
text. 
77. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b)(4). Subsection (b), entitled "definitions" has ten para-
graphs of which "Tax Administration" subsection (4)(A) means-
(i) the administration, management, conduct, direction, and 
supervision of the execution and application of the internal 
revenue laws or related statutes ... and 
(B) includes assessment, collection, enforcement, litiga-
tion, publication, and statistical gathering functions 
under such laws, statutes, or conventions. 
See also, Rueckert v. IRS 775 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1985). The Illinois Department 
of Revenue has a rule forbidding its agents from engaging in outside employment. 
Finding evidence in agent Rueckert's state tax return that he might be doing so, Illinois 
requested and received his federal return to establish his sources of income, and rep-
rimanded him for pursuing outside employment on the basis of that return informa-
tion. Rueckert sued the IRS, alleging that its disclosure of his tax return information 
to Illinois violated his right to confidentiality. Finding no case law on the specific ques-
tion, the court reviewed the legislative history and wording of section 6103, focussing 
particularly on § 6103(d) permitting disclosure to state agencies for tax administra-
tion, and § 6103(b)(4), definition of tax administration. Finding the definition of tax 
administration "so sweeping as to compel rejection of restrictive interpretation" the 
court denied Rueckert's claim. Rueckert, 775 F.2d at 211, (quoting Unites States v. 
Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (l978). Accord Davidson v. 
Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mich. 1983), affd. on other grounds, 732 F.2d 552 (6th 
Cir. 1984), (quoted in Rueckert, 775 F.2d at 211.) (Where Davidson's tax return was 
disclosed in another man's federal judicial proceeding pertaining to tax administra-
tion, the disciosure was authorized under the tax administration exception.) Rueckert, 
775 F.2d at 211. 
78. In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), petition 
for reh'g. denied, 696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982). The nexus test depends on an inter-
pretation of § 6103(bX2), the definition of return information. The court in In Re Grand 
Jury found that an IRS agent's disclosure to the United States attorney that defen-
dant Jackson had threated potential witnesses against him in a grand jury investi-
gation of irregularities in his tax returns was not "return information." Finding that 
the information was related to an obstruction of justice violation, and had nothing to 
to with tax irregularities, the court rejected Jackson's claim that the disclosure was 
just cause for him to refuse to comply with the grand jury SUbpoena. Id. 
79. First W. Gov't. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356, 359-60 (lOth Cir. 
1986) (IRS disclosure that taxpayer had invoked the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination was not return information.) 
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Within the Ninth Circuit, at both the district court level and 
in the Court of Appeals, courts have given a broad reading to 
section 6103, finding that the tax information disclosed had 
already lost its confidential status, and denying damages to the 
complaining taxpayer.80 In 1985, United Energy Corporation 
was denied damages under 26 U.S.C. § 7431 for unauthorized 
disclosure to the press under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).81 The 
court held that when a United States Attorney merely 
answered questions asked by a reporter about a complaint 
filed by United Energy against the IRS, his statements con-
firming that the IRS was investigating United Energy were not 
a disclosure of confidential tax information; by filing its com-
plaint asking the court to stop the investigation, United Energy 
was held to have "lost any entitlement to privacy in that 
information. "82 
. In 1987, the Ninth Circuit set forth a baseline interpreta-
tion of section 6103 in Stokwitz v. United States. The court ruled 
that an unauthorized search of Stokwitz's office and brief-
case, and seizure of his personal copies of his tax returns by his 
supervisor and secretary, both government employees, was 
not a disclosure forbidden under section 6103.83 The court rea-
soned that the statute must be read as a whole; that its pur-
pose was to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of tax 
information actually filed with the IRS, and that copies were 
80. United Energy Corp. v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. Cal. 1985); 
Stokwitz v. United States 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987); and Lampert v. United 
States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988). 
81. United Energy, 622 F. Supp. at 45. The court quotes section 6103(h)(4)(C) 
authorizing the disclosure of return information "in a Federal or State judicial pro-
ceeding pertaining to tax administration, but only ... if such return or return infor-
mation directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party 
to the proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in 
the proceeding.~ 6103(h)(4)(c). 
The Tenth and Sixth Circuits have also extended the range of permissible dis-
closure under § 6103 (h)(4)(C) to include disclosure to the press and other interested 
parties, even though there is no specific § 6103 exception permitting such disclosure. 
In 1986, the Tenth Circuit held that the statutory language did not specifically limit 
itselfto disclosures made to federal officials, thus the section applied to disclosures 
made to anyone. Note, Meaning of-Return Information- within Internal Revenue Code 
Section 6103 and When Return Information May Be Disclosed by the Internal Revenue 
Service under Section 6103 (h)(4), 65:4 DEN. U.L. REV. 646. The Note discusses First 
Western Government Securities v. United States, 796 F. 2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986). Accord 
Davidson v. Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.O. Mich, 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 
1984); Note, Meaning at 649 n.95. 
82. United Energy, 622 F. Supp. at 46. 
83. Stokwitz, 831 F.2d at 894. The court suggested that Stokwitz's more appro-
priate remedy was the Bivens action he had also filed against his employer. Id. 
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not covered by the statute.1U Quoting from the legislative his-
tory, the court found that Congress's overriding purpose was 
to curtail loose disclosure practices by the IRS, and abuse by 
government agencies of information filed with the IRS.86 The 
court read the elaborate disclosure procedures codified in sec-
tion 6103 as establishing a "comprehensive scheme for con-
trolling the release by the IRS of information ... That is as far 
as the statute goes ... There is no indication in either the 
language of section 6103 or its legislative history that Congress 
intended to enact a general prohibition against public disclo-
sure of tax information"86 (emphasis in original). Such an 
interpretation would be excessively burdensome, since 
"[slection 6103 was not designed to provide the only means for 
obtaining tax information; it simply provides the only means 
for acquiring such information from the IRS. "87 
In Lampert v. United States, the Ninth Circuit expanded on 
the reasoning in United Energy Corp. and Stokwitz, holding 
that "once return information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial 
forum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not 
violate" section 6103.88 The court surveyed the cases holding for 
strict interpretation of section 6103, disagreeing with Rodgers 
u. Hyatt and Johnson v. Sawyer which had held that press 
releases concerning tax information already in the public 
record were an unauthorized disclosure.89 Rejecting the argu-
ment that for a government employee to disclose any return 
information, confidential or not, there must exist an applica-
ble exception to 6103, the court stated, "Only a strict 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 894-95. 
86. [d. at 895-96. 
87. Stokwitz, 831 F.2d at 897. The court points out that if a government 
employee obtained tax information by subpoena, discovery, or other appropriate way 
and subsequently disclosed that information, the government would be liable for 
civil or criminal penalties if section 6103 procedures were the only avenue for dis-
closure. 
88. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988). Three cases were 
consolidated for appeal to the Ninth Circuit: Lampert u. United States, Figur u. 
United States, and Peinado u. United States. The court affirmed the district court's hold-
ing in each that press releases related to tax proceedings were not unauthorized dis-
closures. The United States Attorney issued press releases summarizing tax evasion 
charges against Figur; issued two press releases in Peinado, one announcing that he 
had pleaded guilty to tax evasion, and another revealing his sentence. In Lampert, the 
government sought an injunction against Lampert's promotion and sale of abusive tax 
shelters; both the United States Attorney and the IRS issued press releases on that 
case. 
89. [d. at 337. See also discussion of Rodgers u. Hyatt and Johnson u. Sawyer, 
supra note 75. 
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technical reading of the statute supports [this] position. "90 
The court opined that such a reading would defeat the purposes 
of the statute, and greatly hamper the government's ability to 
publicize the prosecution of tax evaders.91 The court conclud-
ed that once tax return information is lawfully disclosed in 
court proceedings, the 6103 directive to keep the information 
confidential is moot.92 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether former 
Internal Revenue agent Lawrence M. Richey's prosecution 
and conviction for his disclosure to the press of tax information 
violated his first amendment right to freedom of expression.93 
The court first observed that the government may properly 
limit speech when compelling government interests outweigh 
the interests of the speaker.94 The court next identified the 
interests at stake: Richey's interest in a fair trial, which 
includes the right to have an unbiased judge;95 his interest as 
a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, and 
the related interest of the public in being informed about mat-
ters of public concern;96 and the interest of the government in 
protecting the confidentiality of tax information.97 The court 
then balanced Richey's and the public's interests against those 
of the government and found that "Richey's self-serving com-
ments to the press ... are not transmogrified into speech 
worthy of first amendment protection simply because they 
touched upon a matter of public concern. "98 
90. [d. at 338. 
91. [d. The court quotes the footnote from John.son. v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 
1126,1133 n.18, quoted supra note 75. The underlying reasoning is that since one of 
the main purposes of section 6103 was to restore taxpayer confidence in the IRS, a pro-
hibition of press releases showing that tax evaders were being prosecuted (hence, the 
system was being operated fairly) would defeat that goal.. 
92. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. 
93. United States v. Richey 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991). The majority opinion 
was written by O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, joined by Wright, J. The dissent was writ-
ten by Reinhardt, J. who had been a member oflhe panel deciding Stokwitz v. United 
States, 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 1033 (1988). See supra notes 
70, 82-87 and accompanying text. 
94. [d. at 859. The court cites Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829, 841 (1978) for this proposition. However the statement does not appear in 
that case. 
95. Richey, 924 F.2d at 859. 
96. [d. at 860. The court identifies the matter of public concern as potential judi-
cial bias, and the public interest in the operation of the courts. [d. 
97. [d. at 861. 
98. [d. at 863. 
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The court first examined Richey's interest in a fair trial, 
including the right to have an unbiased judge. Assuming for the 
purposes of the appeal that Richey had a colorable claim of 
potential bias by Judge McDonald, the court found Richey's 
interest "substantial. "99 
The majority and the dissent disagreed over the nature of 
Richey's interest in making the statements at issue. This basic 
difference influenced their respective treatments of the consti-
tutional question.1°O The dissent argued that Richey's interest was 
not in obtaining a fair trial, but "in publicizing the facts relat-
ing to his allegedly unfair treatment" in his completed trial. 101 
Richey's claims had two legal grounds: whether Judge McDonald 
violated the recusal statute by presiding over Richey's trial, 102 
99. Richey, 924 F.2d at 859. The court allowed Richey's claim of bias to stand since 
the disclosure at issue occurred in October, 1987, while his conviction for conspiracy 
to defraud the IRS was on appeal (notice filed July 10, 1987 [USDC Eastern District 
of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1, hereinafter, Docket CR-85-169-1]) to the 
Ninth Circuit on that ground among others. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 817 (9th 
Cir. 1989)(memorandum disposition). 
On May 5, 1989, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the "odd provision in his sentence 
(now eradicated) requiring him not to criticize the government of the United S[tjates 
... while not defensible, does not bespeak prejudice." (mem. at 4-5). 
Richey was joined by the ACLU in arguing that the provision violated his first 
amendment rights. Since Richey'S disclosures had triggered a probation revocation 
hearing December 8,1988 in which a different judge removed the restraining provi-
sions (and also changed the prison sentence from 45 years to 15 counts of3 years each, 
running concurrently)(Docket CR-85-l69-H), the court termed the issue moot. 
The test for mootness set forth in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539,546-547 (1976), "capable of repetition, yet evading review," was interpreted by 
the court as follows: "There has been no showing that Richey is in danger of being resen-
tenced to hold his tongue," (mem. at 12) a reading at odds with the Supreme Court's 
explication of the rule, since the phrase "capable of repetition" refers to any future 
abuse, not just one involving the same party. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 546-547. The Ninth 
Circuit reading would not recognize a showing that any judge might in the future 
impose a similar penalty on any defendant. 
100. The court viewed Richey's interest as a due process interest in gaining a fair 
trial, and in that context found Richey's comments to the press disruptive, and the rela-
tionship between his statements and that interest tenuous. Richey, 924 F.2d at 859-
60 n.2, 862 n.6, and 867 n.6. 
"In contrast to the government's 'compelling' interest, Richey'S personal interest 
in having an unbiased judge preside at his trial could hardly be advanced by his gra-
tuitous remarks to the media, particularly given they were made after the trial." [d. 
at 862. Consequently, Richey's remedy was through the appellate process. 
In contrast, the dissent viewed Richey's right to appellate review irrelevant to his 
exercise of his first amendment right to criticize the district court for its conduct of 
his prior trial. [d. at 868. 
101. Richey, 924 F.2d at 867 n.6. 
102. The dissent argued that despite the Ninth Circuit ruling (Richey, 874 F.2d 
817 memorandum) rejecting Richey's claim that the judge should have recused him-
self sua sponte, the test required by 28 U.S.C. 455, supra note 6, and interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health Servo Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847 (1988), 
involves the appearance of bias, as well as actual bias. Richey, 924 F.2d at 865. 
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and whether the judge's conduct was unfair and prejudicia1. 103 
The dissent pointed out that people have a first amendment 
right to criticize the judiciary when they believe a wrong has 
occurred.104 
The court next considered Richey's interest, as a citizen, in 
commenting on matters of public concern. Citing Landmark, 
the court stated that potential judicial bias is clearly a matter 
of public concern, "which Richey had a cognizable interest in 
discussing. "105 The court agreed that the public interest in 
being informed must be considered in any first amendment cal-
culus. 106 However, the court observed that the public interest 
in being informed carries less weight in the balancing process 
when invoked by persons privy to sensitive materials. 107 
Turning to the government interest in protecting the con-
fidentiality of tax information, the court found that confiden-
tiality is necessary to ensure compliance with federal tax laws, 
and that the government also asserts a privacy interest on 
behalf of its citizens. lOB 
Next the court balanced the government interest in main-
taining a workable tax system with Richey's interest, which it 
The dissent pointed to the language of section 455(a), that a judge ·shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 
As long as a reasonable person might question the ability of a judge to be impartial 
in the tax fraud case ofa man who had audited his returns, the statute applies. Richey, 
924 F.2d at 868 n.9. 
103. Richey, 924 F.2d at 868. The dissent found that the judge's conduct in pre-
siding over the trial, and in imposing sentence which included the "wholly unprece-
dented and unconstitutional gag order" provoked Richey's compelling interest in 
bringing his complaint to the public's attention. [d. at 871, 868. 
104. [d. at 868. See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) "Comment after the imposition of sentence - criticism, however unre-
strained, of its severity or lenience ... -is an exercise or the right of free discussion. 
Bridges, 314 U.S. at 300 . 
. 105. Richey, 924 F.2d at 860. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 860-861. The court cites Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978) pointing out that the Supreme Court disavowed taking a posi-
tion on the constitutionality of punishing ·participants" for breach of the confidentiality 
mandate. [d. at 861. 
The dissent rejects the court's argument as having no support in the law, since 
the Supreme Court expressly declined to address the question of whether a disclosure 
of confidential information by a participant, staff member, or witness, rather than by 
a third party would lead to a different outcome. [d. at 867. See also, Butterworth v. 
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1377 (1990) (statute forbidding disclosure of grand jury testimony 
by a witness unconstitutional). 
108. Richey, 924 F.2d at 861. 
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identified as a remedial interest in having an unbiased judge 
preside at his trial. 109 The court characterized the government 
interest as "compelling,""O and found that it outweighed 
Richey's personal interest in having an unbiased judge, since 
his comments to the press would have no effect on the judicial 
process. lll 
Weighing the government interest against Richey's inter-
est as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, 
the court quoted several cases which discuss limitations to a 
public employee's right to comment on such matters.ll2 
Concluding that the government's interest permits restric-
tions on disclosures, the court found Richey's interest 
109. [d. at 862. 
110. [d. The court quoted Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 
1987) for the proposition that the government interest in maintaining a workable tax 
system is "compelling." Bradley made a first amendment challenge to an IRS provi-
sion forbidding the filing of "frivolous" tax returns when he was fined $500 for filing 
a return which contained only his identifying information and a statement con-
demning United States policy in Central America. . 
The dissent pointed out that the "compelling" government interest the Bradley 
court found to outweigh Bradley's first amendment claim was its interest in the fil-
ing of accurate tax returns. "To hold otherwise would frustrate Congress's intent to 
reduce the administrative burden on the IRS from handling forms which are not in 
processible form." Bradley, 817 F.2d at 1404. The Bradley court considered Bradley's 
conduct in filing as well as the speech component, quoting the O'Brien standard, "when 
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suf-
ficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech elements can 
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Bradley, 817 F.2d at 1405, 
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968». 
The dissent stated that by relying on Bradley, the court "improperly trivializes" 
Richey's free speech rights. Richey, 924 F.2d at 870 n.13. 
111. See discussion supra n.100. 
112. Richey, 924 F.2d at 862. The dissent pointed out that none of the cases 
cited by the court supports the conclusion that the IRS interest permits suppres-
sion of Richey's speech. As presented, they provide illustrations of the principle that 
the speech of public employees may be limited under some circumstances. [d. at 869 
n.10. 
E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) concerned an unconstitutional time, 
place, and manner restriction, and an overbroad statute; Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 
426 (9th Cir. 1987) held that a bare assertion that an employee's speech would inter-
fere with efficient government operation cannot support limiting that speech; Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) upheld a limitation on an employee's speech which was 
reasonably likely to disrupt the office where the subject speech was of limited public 
concern; Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) concerned national security, an 
area where the Supreme Court has established special guidelines. Richey, 924 F.2d 
at 869 n.10. 
The court cited United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989) in support 
of the related point that the availability of the disclosed information elsewhere does 
not ease a restriction on speech. Richey 924 F.2d at 863 n.7. However, Posey, like Snepp, 
is a case involving the national security interest. 
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insufficient to outweigh that of the state.1l3 Therefore, the 
court affirmed the conviction.1l4 
THE DISSENTING OPINION 
The dissent opened by describing Richey's "odyssey" through 
the courts as a sad chapter in the history of the Ninth Circuit 
where twice his first amendment rights were violated with the 
active participation of a judiciary unable to grasp the impor-
tance of freedom of speech when it involved criticism of the judi-
ciary.115 Casting the issue in terms of the public's right to know 
of judicial conflicts of interest, the dissent noted the irony 
that Richey was convicted for exercising his free speech rights 
by explaining why he believed a federal judge had imposed an 
order flagrantly violating those rights.116 
Considering first the limitations on the speech of public 
employees, the dissent applied the Pickering-Connick test, 
finding in answer to the first prong of the test, that Richey's 
speech was on a matter of public concern.l17 The dissent found 
that Richey's speech was about judicial bias, and "[t]he oper-
ations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are 
matters of utmost public concern. "118 His responses to reporters' 
questions touched on tax information relevant to Richey's 
claim that the judge should have recused himself.119 
113. Richey, 924 F.2d at 863 n.7. "Moreover, public confidence in the tax system 
is less likely to erode if disclosure is made during the course of a judicial proceeding, 
rather than at the whim of a former IRS agent. Richey's ofiband comments to the press 
suggest to the public that no restrictions of such information exist." Id. 
114. Id. at 863. Since they considered the substance of Richey's speech to be dis-
closure of tax information, the court did not consider the public interest in learning 
of judicial bias, and thus did not consider the nexus argument, although they cited In 
Re Grand Jury Investigation, 696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982) in dismissing Richey's argu-
ment for dismissal of government counsel for disclosure of McDonald's tax information. 
115. Id. at 863. The court characterizes the dissenting opinion as "strident emo-
tional rhetoric." Id. at 859 n.2. 
116. Id. at 865. 
117. Richey, 924 F.2d at 866. See Pickeringv. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The dissent pointed out that the public inter-
est that arose in Richey's case was in itself evidence that he spoke on a matter of pub-
lic concern. In addition, the dissent observed that if law did not require Judge 
McDonald to recuse himself under the circumstances of Richey's case, Richey might 
have had an even more compelling justification for making his charges to the press 
in order to encourage reform of the rules. Richey, 924 F.2d at 869. 
118. Id. at 866. (Quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 
829, 839 (1978 at 866». 
119. Id. Richey supported his allegation with specific facts, maintained the dis-
sent, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Sweeney v. 
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457,458 (D.C.Cir.) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942) "The protection 
of the public requires not merely discussion, but information." Richey, 924 F.2d at 871. 
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The second prong of the test, balancing the free speech 
interest against the asserted government interest, involves a 
factual inquiry into the context and circumstances of the 
speech. Where a first amendment interest is asserted, the 
Constitution requires the court to assess the particular harm 
to the individual and the general harm which would result to 
society from the suppression of the statement at issue. 12o 
The dissent agreed that the government has a weighty 
interest in maintaining a workable tax system and in pro-
tecting the confidentiality of tax information. 121 The dissent nev-
ertheless found that the first amendment protected Richey's 
comments criticizing the conduct of the court, a matter of pub-
lic concern. 122 The dissent observed that the public interest in 
learning about governmental wrongdoing depends on the 
nature of the information, not the identity of its source. 123 
Moreover, the dissent continued, in criminal proceedings, 
there is a great need for public accountability, as openness dis-
courages "decisions based on secret bias or partiality."12' 
Openness is particularly important where a recusal issue has 
arisen in the context of a criminal trial, since public confidence 
in the courts is essential to the community. "[T]he appearance 
of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it."l25 
Th,e dissent concluded that the balance weighed in favor of 
the public interest in learning of judicial bias and against the 
injury to the tax system that might result from a disclosure that 
a judge had once been audited. 126 Finally, the dissent observed 
that the only harm to the taxpayer was the premature disclo-
sure of a small amount oftax information, which under the rul-
ings of the Ninth Circuit would have been in the public record 
120. Richey, 924 F.2d at 870. See also Bridges, 314 U.S. at 293. 
121. Richey, 924 F.2d at 867. Citing Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th 
Cir. 1988) and Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 
U.S. 1033 (1988). 
122. Richey, 924 F.2d at 865. 
123. Id. at 867. See also, First Nat'1. Bank v. Belotti. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (inher-
ent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of its source). 
124. Richey. 924 F.2d at 869 n.ll (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980». 
125. Richey, 924 F.2d at 869 n.11 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 
571-72). See also, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (justice must satis-
fy the appearance of justice.) 
126. Richey, 924 F.2d 870 n.13. The disclosure was inconsequential compared to 
the disclosures judges must make under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,2 U.S.C. § 701 
et seq. (Transferred to 5 U.S.C. 101-112 Nov. 30, 1989). Richey, 924 F.2d at 871 n.14. 
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shortly after Richey's statement to the press.127 In contrast, the 
harm to Richey is the deprivation of his free speech right, or 
criminal sanction if he exercises that right. 
Summarizing the three preeminent factors-that bias on 
the bench involves a breach of public trust, that an individu-
al who believes he is a victim of judicial bias should not be 
silenced by the state, and that the actual disclosure was min-
imal-the dissent found that Richey's speech was protected by 
the first amendment. 128 Therefore, the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied to Richey.129 
IV. COMMENT 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Richey decided that 
26 U.S.C. § 7213, a statute prescribing penalties for unau-
thorized disclosure of tax information, was not unconstitu-
tional as applied to Richey-that his speech was not "worthy 
of first amendment protection" and that the district court did 
not err in denying the motion to dimiss the indictment on 
first amendment grounds. 130 
This comment rests on two premises: first, that the court 
might have avoided the constitutional issue by looking to its 
own precedent in interpreting the statute and granting Richey's 
motion to dismiss or deciding the case on statutory ground. 
Second, having declined to interpret the statute as permitting 
Richey's disclosure, the court should have employed the dis-
sent's constitutional analysis as the more accurate interpre-
tation of the constitutional question. 
A THE ,ApPLICATION OF THE STATUTE 
Richey argued three iss.ues on appeal: whether the trial 
court should have granted the motion to dismiss; whether the 
127. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871. The dissent bases this on the fact that Richey had 
already appealed his conviction when he made his statements to the press. One of the 
grounds he argued on appeal was the recusal issue. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 
817 (9th Cir. 1989)(memorandum disposition). 
In Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Richey 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991), 
Richey asserts that at the sentencing hearing for his false tax return conviction on June 
19, 1987, "Judge McDonald was indirectly reminded by counsel of his connection with 
Appellant." Brief at 2. If this is a matter of public record as part of the sentencing hear-
ing, Richey's case would fall squarely under Lampert. 
128. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871. 
129. 1d. 
130. 1d. at 863. 
25
Pagano: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
168 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:143 
trial court should have granted the motion for removal of 
counsel; and whether [Richey's] disclosure of his audit of Judge 
McDonald was protected by the first amendment. 131 The Ninth 
Circuit in its opinion considered only the constitutional ques-
tion and did not take up the issue of a motion to dismiss under 
the statute.132 However, under existing Ninth Circuit precedent, 
as well as authority from other circuits, Richey's case might 
have been dismissed or decided on statutory grounds. 
First, the Ninth Circuit held in Lampert that "once return 
information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial forum, its sub-
sequent disclosure by press release does not violate" 26 U.S.C . 
. 6103. 133 In October 1987, when he made the statements for 
which he was convicted, Richey had already filed his notice of 
appeal with the district court. Moreover, the controversial 
sentence including the "gag order" was already a matter of pub-
lic record, having been filed July 6, 1987.134 It can be argued 
under Lampert that the disclosure was already a part of the 
public record of judicial proceedings, since the basic events upon 
which Richey would argue his appeal had already taken place, 
and it was only the details which awaited disclosure. Richey's 
appeal could not have been argued without the disclosure, 
and Richey in fact disclosed less than what eventually was 
revealed. 135 
Second, under the nexus test used by the Sixth Circuit, the 
disclosure of information concerning a possible obstruction of 
justice was not considered to be disclosure of "return infor-
mation," even where the communication included an 
131. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991). 
This comment is not concerned with the argument for removal of counsel, which the 
court dismissed. Richey, 924 F.2d. at 863. 
132. The Supreme Court has put forth guidelines for avoiding constitutional 
issues when possible; among them, the Court will not pass on a constitutional ques-
tion, even when it is properly presented, where some other ground is present, such as 
a statute, upon which the case may be decided. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
133. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. The charge against Richey for violating 26 
U.S.C. § 7213 depends upon the terms ofsection 6103 for its application. There is no 
case law interpreting section 7213. 
134. United States District Court, Eastern District, Washington Docket CR-85-
169-1, Sentence or probation order, July 6, 1987. The sentence totalled 45 years, at 
three years for each of fifteen counts, suspended. Richey was placed on probation for 
five years, on condition, among others, that Richey "abstain from making any deroga-
tory statements against the Government." [d. 
135. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (1991) 
states that the United States Attorney revealed the amount of additional tax and the 
tax years involved in Richey's audit of Judge McDonald. 
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incidental disclosure of tax information. ISS The court in In Re 
Grand Jury did not construe the strict protections of the 
statute as disabling IRS employees from reporting a taxpayer's 
criminal conduct unrelated to his IRS obligations.1s7 One may 
apply this reasoning to Richey's allegation of judicial bias, 
which was accompanied by the incidental disclosure of tax 
information as explanation for the alleged bias. Although 
Richey did not allege criminal conduct on the part of the judge, 
his allegations were serious, implying a breach of the public 
trust. 
Third, under the broad definition of "tax administration" fol-
lowed by several circuits, a court could find Richey's disclosure 
permissible. l38 Rueckert provides the closest parallel to Richey's 
situation, where a disclosure pursuant to investigating a conflict 
of interest was found to be authorized under 26 U.S.C. 6103. 1S9 
A judge has not hitherto been considered a party to tax 
administration proceedings for purposes of subsections 
6103(b)(4) or 6103(h)(4). However, under section 6103(h)(5) the 
defendant in a criminal case may inquire whether a prospec-
tive juror has been audited. 140 In United States v. Hashimoto, 
the Ninth Circuit held that failure of the IRS to respond to this 
request resulted in reversible error based on a significant risk 
of prejudice. 141 In view of this holding, and the fact that the rel-
evant tax information of any party to the case may be disclosed 
under 6103(h)(4), it seems illogical that a judge should be 
excused from similar scrutiny if significant risk of prejudice is 
to be avoided. 142 
Finally, the Richey court, in arguing for the taxpayer's 
right to privacy cited Association for American Railroads. 14s 
136. In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982). When the 
IRS informed the United States attorney that the taxpayer was threatening witnesses, 
they.incidentally disclosed that they were investigating him. The court held this not 
to violate § 6103. 
137. Id. at 1071. 
138. 26 U.S.C. 6103(b)(4) and 6103(h)(4). See supra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 
139. Rueckert v. Internal Revenue Service, 775 F.2d 208 (1985). 
140. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (h)(5). 
141. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-71 n.70 (ciling United States v. Hashimoto, 
878 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982). 
142. Indeed, it is possible that the Judge's tax information is a matter of public 
record under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, supra n.126. Irso, Richey's case would 
qualify for summary judgment in his favor. 
143. Richey, 924 F.2d at 861. 
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While it is true that that case stands for the proposition that 
a taxpayer's right to privacy may not be breached by disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act, the holding rests on the 
condition that the taxpayer had not placed his income "at 
issue," since in doing so, the taxpayer waives his right to con-
fidentiality.l" It can be argued that Judge McDonald placed his 
tax information in issue by his conduct in not recusing himself 
and in imposing a draconian sentence on the man he knew had 
audited that information. 
B. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
If a .court rejects the argument that Richey's disclosure 
was authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and thus not subject 
to the criminal penalties under section 7213, then it must 
consider the constitutional challenge, weighing the statute 
against the first amendment right asserted. 
Section 7213 is a subject matter restriction on speech, 
imposing criminal penalites for its violation. 146 Where the 
exercise of protected speech is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion, the statute is subject to heightened scrutiny.l46 Moreover, 
a tax provision which imposes a penalty is to be construed 
strictly; the government must meet its burden of proving all the 
elements of the violation. 147 In Richey's case, the government 
needed to argue and prove that Richey violated each element 
of the statute. But the government did not meet its burden; 
Richey simply admitted making the statement. Given the 
wide variations in interpretation of the terms of the statute, the 
court found itselfin the unenviable constitutional situation of 
weighing a conviction under a federal statute whose terms 
have occasioned disagreement among the courts as to what con-
stitutes its violation, without adequate argument from either 
side on that issue. 
Landmark held that "before a state may punish expression, 
it must prove by actual facts the existence of a clear and 
present danger to the orderly administration of justice. "148 
144. Association of Am. R.R. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D.D.C. 1974). 
145. 26 U.S.C. § 7213, supra note 2. 
146. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) "a governmentally imposed penalty for the exercise of pro-
tected speech is sufficiently like direct suppression to trigger heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny." ld. at 29. ' 
147. Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1402-1403 (9th Cir. 1987). 
148. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 843. 
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The Landmark Court emphasized that a legislative finding of 
possible danger is no substitute for a judicial analysis of the 
statute as applied. Were it otherwise, the court explained, 
the first amendment as a check on legislative power would be 
nullified. 149 In Richey's case, there was no showing of actual 
harm, only the invocation of the sentiments occasioned by the 
situation which inspired the enactment of the statute in the 
first place. Richey's statement, in the context of his posture as 
a criminal defendant appealing his conviction, in no way rais-
es the spectre of executive abuse which spawned the statute's 
elaborate protections. 
The constitutional balance does not change when Richey is 
considered as a former public employee. Whether citizen or for-
mer public employee, he has a right, as the dissent states, to 
speak out if he believes he is the victim of judicial bias. 160 The 
question becomes whether what he says may be limited. 
Restrictions on what former IRS agents and other government 
employees may disclose are necessary to protect the government's 
interest in the orderly administration of tax laws, the system of 
voluntary disclosure, and the confidentiality of individual tax 
information. However, a statute which will not permit disclosure 
under circumstances of criminal defense, except under the most 
technical reading, proves a trap for the unwary, and where 
freedom of speech is the price to be paid, the statute has exceed-
ed constitutional bounds. 161 As the Court in Butterworth point-
ed out, such a restriction on disclosure is permanent, dramatic 
in its effect, and subject to abuse by persons in power. 162 
Christine C. Pagano* 
149. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text. 
150. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871. 
151. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indio 
vidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) (quoted in, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed'!. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971». 
If Richey had obeyed the statute and not spoken to the press, this is what prob-
ably would have happened. The Ninth Circuit would not have changed its finding of 
no bias in the judge's conduct, since it did not consider the gag order a sign of bias. The 
court probably would have lifted the gag order. Then instead of being deprived of his 
constitutional right to criticize the government for the few months he endured that 
sanction before he broke his silence, Richey would have had two years of court 
ordered silence before the decision of the Ninth Circuit lifted it. Of course, if the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed his conviction and found no constitutional insult in the condition of 
probation, Richey would be effectively silenced until July 1992, observing the 200th 
anniversary of the Bill of Rights by not criticizing the judge who sentenced him or the 
Ninth Circuit which affirmed that conviction in an unpublished memorandum. 
152. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (1990). 
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